高管薪酬与盈余管理关系研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据  

Relationship Study of Executive Compensation and Earnings Management:Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作　　者：李建英[1] 戴龙辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学财经学院,广东广州510006 [2]广东电网公司惠州供电局,广东惠州516003

出　　处：《华南理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第1期11-18,共8页Journal of South China University of Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：2011年广东省自然科学基金资助项目"基于真实盈余活动操纵的企业盈余管理行为研究";项目编号:S2011010005553

摘　　要：选取2008-2010年间中国A股上市公司作为研究样本,以操控性应计利润作为盈余管理程度的代理变量,实证检验了高管年薪、持股及两者交叉项分别与盈余管理之间的关系。实证结果显示,短期年薪可以促进盈余管理,高管持股可以抑制盈余管理,但短期年薪和高管持股两者相乘的交叉项却可以抑制高管的盈余管理行为。This paper selects the 2008 -2010 China A-share listed companies as the study sample, handling accruals as a proxy variable of the extent of earnings management. It examines the relationship between executives annual salary and earnings management, the managerial ownership and earnings management, and the both respectively and earnings management. The empirical results show that short-term annual salary can contribute to earnings man- agement, and managerial ownership can inhibit earnings management, but the mix of them can inhibit the earnings management behavior.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 盈余管理 Jones模型 应计利润 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]