中国农地转用的制度框架及其软约束问题  

Institutional Framework for Rural-urban Land Conversion in China and Its soft Constraint Defect

作　　者：陈伟[1] 王喆[1] 

机构地区：[1]国家发展和改革委员会经济体制与管理研究所,北京100035

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2014年第3期61-68,共8页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家发展和改革委员会经济体制与管理研究所改革专项研究项目

摘　　要：该文旨在分析我国农地转用的制度软约束问题并提出改革建议。作者提出了一个以地方政府为主体的农地转用决策模型,在该模型中,农地价值、市地价值、不可逆风险和制度性约束是四个主要变量。聚焦农地转用的制度性约束:首先,农民自主转用农地存在法律限制和集体土地所有制内生的产权模糊性,导致农民自我维权能力的弱化,难以有效限制地方政府的农地转用;其次,虽然中央政府试图通过用途管制和指标计划纵向控制地方政府的农地转用行为,但由于其自身的多目标性,往往更加注重经济增长目标,纵向控制失灵问题长期存在;最后,现行政治架构和行政体制的局限,农地转用和征收公益性审查过程缺乏民主机制,征收补偿行为和强制执行行为缺乏独立的司法介入,导致对地方政府转用农地行为缺乏横向制衡。基本结论是:在中国,由于农民自我保护、中央纵向控制以及同级横向的权力制衡失灵,在地方政府的农地转用过程中存在着严重的制度软约束问题,这直接导致了农地过度转用所带来的土地资源低效利用和土地增值分配失衡。基于这一结论,提出了关于农地转用制度改革的三个方向性建议:一是增强农民自我维权的能力,这就需要建立清晰的农村土地产权制度,特别是赋予农民自主转用农地的权利,提高农地转用的市场化程度;二是增强中央政府对地方政府转用农地的控制能力,以科学发展为导向,完善和落实主体功能区规划,实行差异化的政绩考核机制,关键是实现不同地区土地发展权的均衡配置;三是强化立法和司法对行政的监督,有效发挥地方人大和法院的制衡作用。The paper is intended to analyze the soft institutional constraint to rural-urban land conversion process in China and gives some proposal for further reform.The author constructs a decision-making model of rural-urban land conversion in which the local governments are policymakers taking four factors into account including rural land value,urban land value,irreversibility risk and institutional constraints.The article focuses on the last variable.It points out that it is difficult to limit the rural-urban land conversion by farmers＇ self-advocacy because of the legal defect on farmers＇ independent development of rural land,and inherent land right ambiguity of collective land ownership.And there is a long-lasting vertical control failure because of the multi-objective issue which give more weight to economic growth,though the central government is trying to limit local land conversion by use regulations and planning measures.Additionally,in view of contemporary political framework and administrative system,local governments could convert rural land to urban use without horizontal counterweights because there is no democratic mechanism to check the land conversion and Land acquisition is in the public interest,and the courts have not intervened the compensation and enforcement process effectively either.The conclusion of the paper is that ＂three failures＂,including weak self-advocacy of farmers,hesitant vertical control and powerless horizontal check,have resulted in serious soft institutional restraint to rural-urban land conversion dominated by local governments,which leads to excessive conversion of rural land,inefficient use of land resources and out-of-balance of land value increment during use change.On the basis of above analysis,three recommendations are proposed at the end of the paper：1）Improving the farmers＇ capability of maintain their own benefits,which requiring to construct a clear rural land property system,especially empowering farmers with the right to convert their rural land indep

关 键 词：农地转用 农地制度 软约束 土地征收 

分 类 号：F321[经济管理—产业经济]