专用性投资、治理机制与企业绩效——来自制造业上市公司的经验证据  

Specific Assets,Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Manufacturing Companies

作　　者：于茂荐[1] 孙元欣[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200041 [2]上海财经大学世博研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2014年第1期39-47,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(08JA630050);上海理工大学博士科研启动经费资助项目

摘　　要：专用性投资治理问题是近年来国内外关注的热点问题。本文利用2007—2009年沪深制造业上市公司的经验证据,探讨了专用性投资、治理机制与企业绩效之间关系。研究发现:(1)在专用性投资的治理机制选择上,关系治理机制比正式治理机制更有效率;(2)如果缺乏治理机制保护,专用性投资对企业绩效产生负面影响;(3)环境不确定性加剧了专用性投资被机会主义侵占的风险,技术水平在专用性投资和企业绩效之间起到了正向的调节作用。A firm＇s unique assets are essential to the formulation of supply chain management strategies.However,the extant theory shows that specific asset could pose risks to a firm because it can encourage the opportunistic behavior of investors.Formal hierarchical and relational governance mechanisms are used in supply chain alliance to mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior caused by specific assets.However,not much is known about the governance cost of each governance mechanism.In this paper we hypothesize that different governance mechanisms may have different governance efficiency and have different impact on firm performance.We construct a discussion frame based on specific asset,governance mechanisms and firm pedormance.The study uses the database of Chinese A share listed manufacturing firms during 2007-2009,and the findings support our proposed hypotheses.Firstly,our findings validate the central tenet of transaction cost analysis.Specific assets promote integration because the probability of opportunism to appropriate quasi-rents increases with highly specialized investment.However,hierarchical governance does not significantly improve firm pedormance.Relational governance mechanisms improve firm pedormance to the degree that specific assets are involved.This result indicates that relational governance is more efficient than hierarchical governance.Our research provides implications for the choice of the appropriate governance mechanisms for firms making specific investments.While hierarchy is considered as a more efficient way to organize when specific assets are created,our research suggests that relational governance mechanisms may be a good choice.Secondly,we find that if there is no safeguard from governance mechanisms specific assets will have negative effect on form performance.Specific assets have important value-creation properties.However specific assets also involve considerable risk.In the absence of appropriate safeguards the other parties can take advantage of the situation and reduce the i

关 键 词：专用性投资 正式治理 关系治理 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]