“消保”难保消费者?网络购买中“消费者保障服务”的博弈分析  

Can “Consumer Protection Plans”Really Protect Consumers? A Game Theoretical Analysis

作　　者：李玲芳[1] 徐思远[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学经济学院高等研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2014年第1期102-109,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：上海市浦江人才计划资助项目(10PGC040);上海财经大学"211工程"重点学科建设资助项目;上海市重点学科建设资助项目(B801)

摘　　要：网购市场在中国的发展前景广阔,但同时不可避免地存在常见的"柠檬市场"的问题。如何解决这一问题是促使中国的网购市场健康发展的重要前提。针对该问题,中国各大B2B、B2C以及C2C网购网站为了确保买卖双方的利益,纷纷在网上推行"消费者保障服务"。这个机制旨在让高质量的卖家通过发出信号来区别于低质量的卖家,在一定程度上遏制了网络欺诈等恶行。本文通过建立信号博弈模型,发现现有的"消费者保障服务"仍旧存在机制上的漏洞:在一定条件下,低质量的卖家反而可以利用"消费者保障服务"伪装成高质量的卖家对买家进行欺诈;针对该漏洞,本文提出了将缴纳保证金的数额与受到投诉的次数挂钩等解决方法。The e-commerce market in China is promising but suffers the ＂lemon market＂ problem.It is important to win consumers＇ trust in China because local consumers prefer to pay cash after receiving products.To solve the trust and trust-worthiness problem in online markets,many B2B,B2C,and C2C markets provide ＂consumer protection plan＂ to reduce fraudulent transactions.In this paper,we provide a theoretical analysis of the ＂consumer protection plan＂ and show that the plan may not necessarily work as desired.Under certain conditions,the low quality seller can take advantage of the current plan.The lower quality seller can pretend to be a high quality seller by choosing the protection plan and then take advantage of buyers to gain more profits.We also provide suggestions on how to improve the plan,such as relating the amount of caution money to the frequency of complaints.The first session of this paper is introduction.It points out the unique problem of trust and trust-worthiness in Chinese on-line market.Consumers always have doubts on online sellers.Many papers have shown that honesty is the most important factor that affects transfer quantity.In order to build up consumers＇ confidence in online market,e-commerce markets carry out the ＂consumer protection plan＂ which intends to help high quality sellers send signals to consumers.However,this plan may not necessarily work.So whether this mechanism is efficient needs further study.In the second session,we build a game theoretical model based on the ＂consumer protection plans＂.This study uses Taobao＇s plan as an example.The critical part of this plan is that the seller deposits and arbitrates consumers＇ complaints.Although consumers have the right to return items for free,who pays for shipping depends on Taobao＇s arbitration.Therefore,the result of the arbitration will affect the efficiency of the plan.In the third session,we solve the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the signal model.In theory,the current mechanism should be efficient to some

关 键 词：网络购物 '消费者保障服务' 保证金 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]