论双层股权结构的公司实践及制度配套——兼论我国的监管应对  

Dual Class Share Structure Discussion and Our Regulatory Response Towards It

作　　者：陈若英[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学法学院,北京100871

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2014年第3期4-9,共6页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：双层股权结构虽偏离了"一股一票"原则,但在全球市场获得了认可。境外资本市场的商业实践和实证研究表明,该结构发挥了积极功能,投融资双方对之有正当需求,我国需正视。但在双层股权结构下,公众投资者未必能自主"用脚投票"以抑制管理层,而且这一结构可能致董事会监督机制失效,迫使公众投资者更多依赖监管和司法救济。将此结构引入我国需配套两类新制度:公司须公开说明采纳该结构的必要性和对公众投资者利益安全性的保障;建立类仲裁纠纷解决机制,充分发挥专业人士的信息和资源优势,有效救济公众投资者并威慑实际控制人。Dual class share structure is a deviation from ＂One Commercial practice and empirical studies have demonstrated Share One Vote＂ principle, but has been recognized in global market. its positive functions. Parties of financing transactions have legitimate need of it and we need to respect it. Public investors, however, may fail to ＂vote with feet＂ to keep managers under control, likely causing the failure of board of directors＇ supervision of managers, pressing public investors to rely upon regulation and court instead. To introduce it to China, we need two new institutions： issuers to explain the necessity of adopting this share structure and the mechanism through which the interests of public investors are protected, and to establish a quasi-arbitration system, taking full advantages of the expertise and financing resources of market players, effective relieving public investors and deterring the actual controllers.

关 键 词：双层股权结构 一股一票 反收购工具 公众投资者保护 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理]