链与链基于规模不经济的纵向联盟和利润分享  

Vertical alliance and profit sharing contract based on diseconomies of scale under chain-to-chain competition

作　　者：赵海霞[1] 艾兴政[1] 唐小我[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2014年第1期48-56,共9页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070);中央高校基本科研业务费--优秀博士生支持计划项目(ZYGX2012YB033)

摘　　要：基于链与链数量竞争及制造商的生产规模不经济环境,识别了纵向联盟的形成机制和利润分享合约的设计,并进一步分析了市场竞争强度和规模不经济参数对分享比例选择范围的影响.研究结果表明:不管制造商是否存在规模不经济,仅当横向数量竞争相对较弱时;或者制造商存在相对较高的规模不经济成本,且横向竞争又较为激烈时,纵向联盟与利润分享机制是实现制造商和零售商绩效均改进的占优均衡机制,且制造商的利润分享比例范围随横向竞争的加剧而减小.若制造商的规模不经济程度在适度范围内,且数量竞争较激烈,则该分享比例范围随规模不经济程度的加深而变大;若制造商的规模不经济程度继续增强,则该分享比例范围随规模不经济程度的加强而变小.Based on chain-to-chain quantity competition and the manufacturers＇ scale diseconomies, only identified the valid mechanism for vertical alliances formation and the alternative range of profit we not sharing contracts, but also analyzed the impact of product competition and scale diseconomies on the choice of alli- ances and profit sharing contract. The results show that the vertical alliance which contributes Pareto improve- ment to both the manufacturer and retailer is a dominant equilibrium when （i） the quantity competition be- tween the two supply chains is very weak and no matter whether the manufacturer＇ s production exhibits dis- economies of scale ; （ii） the quantity competition is fierce relatively and the manufacturer＇ s production exhib- its high diseconomies of scale. What is more, the manufacturer＇ s proportion range of profit sharing will de- crease with the increased intensity of quantity competition under this condition. However, the range of the manufacturer＇ s profit sharing proportion will increase with the increased intensity of scale diseconomies when the manufacturer exhibits a proper intensity of scale diseconomies and the retailer faces relatively fierce competition, but decrease when the manufacturer exhibits a higher intensity of scale diseconomies.

关 键 词：链与链 数量竞争 规模不经济 纵向联盟 利润分享 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]