代理成本、控股权性质与跨部门补贴  

Agency Costs,Nature of Controlling Shareholder and Cross-Subsidization

作　　者：万伟[1] 曾勇[1] 李强[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都611731

出　　处：《管理科学》2014年第2期60-73,共14页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71102054);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(ZYGX2010J124)~~

摘　　要：企业集团通过内部资本市场可以将资源从低融资约束部门转移输送至高融资约束部门,以缓解后者的资金约束程度,同时导致跨部门补贴问题,集团总部对跨部门补贴双方的投资-现金流敏感性将产生不同的影响。基于2003年至2010年中国A股上市公司的7 181个年度样本数据,采用OLS多元回归和固定效应模型等实证研究方法,从投资-现金流敏感性角度检验中国企业集团的跨部门补贴及其影响因素问题。研究结果表明,中国企业集团存在明显的跨部门补贴现象,部门经理层代理成本的增大既能减轻集团对补贴方的资源转移程度,又能减弱集团对被补贴方融资约束的缓解作用,说明跨部门补贴主要在经理层代理成本较低的部门之间进行。大股东代理成本即控制权与现金流权的分离加重了补贴提供方的资源转移程度,却促进了被补贴方融资约束的缓解;控股权性质从非国有控股到国有中央政府控股,企业集团的跨部门补贴问题逐步减轻。The problem of cross-subsidization emerges when business groups transfer resources from sectors with low financial con- straints to those with high financial constraints through internal capital markets to relieve financial constraints of the latter. Group headquarters affect differently the investment-cash flow sensitivity of the cross-subsidization sectors. Based on 7 181 firm-year ob- servation samples from Chinese A-share listed companies over the period of 2003-2010, we adopt OLS multiple regression and fixed effects model to explore Chinese business groups＇ cross-subsidization and its influencing factors. The results show that there is an obvious cross-subsidization phenomenon in Chinese business groups. The rise of division managers＇ agency cost not only de- creases the degree of groups＇ resource transfer to the subsidizing party, but inhibits the relief function of financing constraints for the subsidized party, which shows that cross-subsidization mainly happens among sectors with low agency costs of division manag- ers. The agency costs of controlling shareholders, i.e. the separation of control rights and cash flow rights, aggravate the re- source transfer to the subsidizing party, but promote the relief function of financing constraints for the subsidized party. As the rise of group government control level, the cross-subsidization gradually decreases.

关 键 词：代理成本 控股权性质 跨部门补贴 企业集团 内部资本市场 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]