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作 者:卓萍[1]
出 处:《西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2014年第2期130-137,共8页Journal of Northwest University:Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition
基 金:国家社会科学基金重点项目(10AZD005);教育部人文社会科学研究青年资助项目(11YJC630308);华侨大学引进人才科研启动项目资助(12BS108)
摘 要:衍生于政府绩效管理的发展背景,政府绩效合同的出现契合了从传统单向型行政命令转化为契约双向约束型的发展趋势,是一种确保政府成为"精明买家"的新型政府工具。文章依循交易成本分析框架,将"反思理性的复杂人"作为分析绩效合同双方行为的逻辑起点,分别从绩效合同双方目标的不一致性、绩效合同资产专用性及绩效合同目标与行为的转换风险这三大维度分析影响政府绩效合同实现的本源性因素。Derived from the development background of government performance management, the appearance of performance contract meets the tendency from the traditional one-way into cooperation two-way. It is a new government tool which would secure government as a "smart buyer". Based on the Transaction Costs Theory, taking "reflective rationality complex man" as the starting point of the two parties of the government perform- ance contract behavior, the paper is divided into three dimensions which are respectively contract both target inconsistency, asset specificity and performance contract goal and behavior risk of transformation to expand the origin of Influence factors
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