基于核主元分析的过程控制系统欺骗攻击  

Deception attacks in process control systems using kernel principal component analyses

作　　者：陈冬青[1] 彭勇[1] 王华忠[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国信息安全测评中心,北京100085 [2]华东理工大学自动化系,上海200237

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第12期1694-1698,共5页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

摘　　要：针对过程控制系统的传感器信号欺骗攻击,提出了一种基于数据驱动的黑箱检测方法。首先以典型化工单元连续搅拌釜式反应器CSTR过程控制系统为对象,建立了其欺骗攻击模型;接着,开发了基于核主元分析传感器信号欺骗检测算法和在线实施步骤,最后针对CSTR控制系统的反应温度欺骗攻击检测进行了仿真研究,结果表明本文方法在攻击行为发生后能快速、准确地检测出攻击行为。A deception detection method was developed using a data-driven technique to deal with sensor signal attacks on process control systems. An attack model is developed to attack the control system of a continuously stirred tank reactor （CSTR）. Then, an algorithm was developed for deception detection using kernel principal component analysis with on line implementation. Simulation of the deception detection of the reactor temperature show that this method more quickly and accurately detects eyber attacks.

关 键 词：核函数主元分析 欺骗攻击 信息安全 过程控制系统 

分 类 号：TP29[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]