广告介入的供应商与零售商自有品牌竞争博弈  

Competition Game of National and Store Brands with Advertisement Intervention

作　　者：吕芹[1] 霍佳震[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学悉尼工商学院,上海201800 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2014年第2期174-178,共5页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70832005);上海高校青年教师培养资助计划项目

摘　　要：考虑一个零售商同时出售制造商品牌产品和零售商自有品牌产品的营销渠道,这两类产品之间存在一定竞争性。制造商与零售商分别进行广告投资促销,假设制造商广告投资对零售商品牌产品销售有负面影响,制造商广告成本信息为制造商私有信息。考虑了一个制造商-零售商两阶段Stackelberg博弈。最后,对博弈的均衡解进行分析,并讨论了制造商选择广告成本信息共享或私有的条件。We consider a marketing channel where a retailer sells, along with a manufacturer＇s brand, its own brand. Both the manufacturer and the retailer invest in product advertisement. Assuming that the manufacturer＇s advertisement has a negative impact on the retailer＇s sales, and the cost of the advertisement of the manufacturer is private, we construct a two-stage Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. We discuss the conditions when the manufacturer should choose information sharing or keeping it private.

关 键 词：供应链 博弈论 信息分享 分销渠道 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]