产权性质、治理环境与内部控制的治理效应——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Ultimate Ownership,Governance Environment and Governance Effect of Internal Control——Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：郑军[1] 林钟高[1] 彭琳[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学商学院,安徽马鞍山243002 [2]安徽工业大学工商学院,安徽马鞍山243002

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2014年第2期73-78,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71272220);国家社会科学基金(13BGL049);安徽工业大学青年教师科研基金(QS201305)

摘　　要：以2007～2011年的中国上市公司为研究对象，考察了内部控制对企业代理成本和代理效率的影响，并进一步考察了在不同的治理环境下，内部控制的治理效应在不同产权性质的企业中是否存在显著差异。研究结果显示，企业内控质量的改善能抑制代理成本，提高代理效率，与非国有企业相比，国有企业内控质量的改善更能抑制代理成本和提高代理效率，在控制了内生性的问题后，上述结论仍然成立；进一步发现，在治理环境较好的地区，与非国有企业相比，国有企业内控质量的改善对抑制代理成本的作用更明显。This paper takes Chinese firms listed from 2007 to 2011 as samples, and examines how the internal control affect the agency cost of companies, further investigates how the ownership nature of the ultimate controller and the governance environment affect the governance of the internal control. The results show that the higher quality of internal control can not only help reduce the agency cost of firms, but also can help enhance the agency efficiency of firms; moreover, as compared with NSOEs, the relation of the higher quality of internal control and the agency cost and the agency efficiency of SOEs is more significant. These results hold after we control the endogeneity problem. Furthermore, we find that the more developed the governance environment in regions where the listed firms are located, as compared with NSOEs, the relation of the higher quality of the internal control and the agency cost of SOEs is more significant.

关 键 词：产权性质 治理环境 内部控制 代理成本 代理效率 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]