制造商风险规避下闭环供应链专利授权经营策略  

Patent authorization strategy of closed-loop supply chain under manufacturer risk aversion

作　　者：高鹏[1] 聂佳佳[2] 谢忠秋[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏理工学院商学院,江苏常州213001 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2014年第3期680-688,共9页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101120;71101055;71103149);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC630183);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2013SJB6300030);江苏理工学院基础及应用基础资助项目(KYY12050)~~

摘　　要：为解决制造商风险规避特性可能引起的闭环供应链效用损失,利用博弈论研究了由一风险规避型制造商及一风险中性经销商构成的专利授权型二级闭环供应链系统。进行了制造商风险规避度及市场不确定性对零售价、回收价、专利许可费及各方效用的灵敏度分析,比较研究了不同决策模型对供应链各方效用的影响,并利用利润共享费用共担机制进行了供应链协调。研究表明:制造商对两市场风险感知的增大有利于提升各自市场的期望销售量,降低单位专利许可费,增加经销商的期望利润和供应链总效用;集中决策下的零售价、回收价以及供应链总效用均优于分散决策;由于制造商风险规避特性的存在,供应链仅能实现效用的帕累托改进而无法完全协调。To solve the loss of closed-loop supply chain effectiveness caused by manufacturer risk aversion,the twolevel closed loop supply chain system constructed by one risk-aversion manufacturer and one risk-neutral dealer was studied based on game theory.The sensitivity analysis of manufacturer＇s risk aversion and market uncertainty to retail price,recovery price,patent licensing fees and the parties＇ utility was conducted.The influence of different decision-making model on each supply chain party＇s utility was compared,and the supply chain was coordinated by revenue and expense sharing mechanism.The research showed that the increased risk perception for two markets of manufacturer could improve the expected sales of each market,reduce the unit patent licensing fees and increase the dealer＇s expected profit and total utility of supply chain.The retail price,recovery price and total utility of supply chain in the centralized decision model were better than the decentralized decision model.Due to the manufacturer risk aversion,the supply chain only could achieve Pareto improvement but not fully coordinate.

关 键 词：风险规避 专利许可 闭环供应链 协作机制 博弈论 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]