信访激励的法经济学分析——以信访者利益诉求与纠纷解决为视角  

An Economic Approach to the Letters and Calls System

作　　者：陈慰星[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学法学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《华侨大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2014年第1期97-102,161,共7页Journal of Huaqiao University(Philosophy & Social Sciences)

基　　金：福建省教育科学"十二五"规划重点课题(FJCGZZ12-016);福建省社会科学基金项目(2011B147);华侨大学"中央高校基本科研业务费"(JB-SK1113);华侨大学科研启动费(10BS108)

摘　　要：信访作为一种公共产品,属于缺乏消费弹性的刚性产品。信访的免费性激励当事人进行信访,但作为信访消费者的纠纷当事人,往往会沉溺于纠纷解决"沉没成本"的心理效应,而导致对于穷尽一切纠纷解决方式的信访兜底路径依赖,从而扩大了对信访公共产品的需求。作为信访产品提供者的国家,虽可以通过信访机制获得对代理人地方治理的绩效考评,改善中央对地方的治理委托过程中的信息不对称。不过,这种改善的前提在于需要配套足够的上级信访受案容量,以免造成信访者为获得信访纠纷解决而产生的过频过度放大纠纷强度的逆向激励。但是,这种前提却存在着逻辑悖论,即为了满足信访的供应量而实现的放量信访纠纷解决公共产品供应,只会分流其他正式的纠纷解决机制,并反过来加剧信访本身的拥堵,进而使得信访制度这一公共产品劣质化。Letters and calls （Petition） as a kind of public good, is lack of flexibility for consuming. Free petition that in- cites disputers conducting petition will expand the demand of public petition service supplement, therefore they follow the path dependence of exhaustive remedies due to ＂sunk cost＂ psychological effect. As a petition service provider, national system will conduct its local bureaucratic agent＇s performance evaluation and improve the asymmetric information between the central and local governance. However, this improvement applies adequate supplement petition services, so as to avoid petitioners increase their petition request for the petition filing. The cost-income formula shows the following petition para- dox： Petitioners have to suffer a decision to increase more request for more possibility of petition filing while to encourage more disputers to apply more petitions. When the petition servicers increase more supplement for better disputes resolution will shunt other formal remedies in turn exacerbate the pressure of petition services.

关 键 词：信访制度 纠纷解决机制 法经济学 

分 类 号：D915[政治法律—诉讼法学]