融资约束、代理冲突与现金—现金流敏感性  

Financing Constraints,Agency Conflicts with Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity

作　　者：赵治磊[1] 陈旭东[1] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学经济与管理学院,新疆石河子832003

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2014年第3期43-45,共3页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目"市场化进程;控股股东控制与公司现金股利政策"(项目编号:10YJA630015)阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文以2007年至2011年沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,对融资约束和代理冲突与公司现金—现金流敏感性的关系进行了实证研究。结果表明,公司外部受到的债务融资约束与现金—现金流敏感性呈现正相关;相对于股权集中组的公司,股权分散组的公司,其现金—现金流敏感性更强;与股权集中度相比,融资约束对现金—现金流敏感性影响更为显著。这表明我国的现金持有行为受到代理理论和融资约束的共同作用,但是融资约束起主导作用。this paper is composed with the research sample of A share manufacturing-list companies in stock marckets of Shanghai and Shenzhen during2007-2011,to have a analysis of the relationship among financing constraints agency confliet,cash-cash flow sensitivity.The research demonstrates that debt financing constraints has positive relationship with cash-cash flow sensitivity,compared with companies of Ownership concentration(share proportion of the largest shareholder occupies more than 30%).equity separation(share proportion of the largest sharcholder occupies less than 30%),cash-cash flow has a strong phase of sensitivity.Meanwhile,compared with share concentration,financing constraints play significant at cash-cash flow sensitivity.It can be indicated that agency theory and financing constraints have a co-effect on cash holding in our country with the dominant of financing constraints.

关 键 词：融资约束 代理冲突 现金-现金流敏感性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224