收益共享契约下内生偏好零售商供应链协调  

Supply Chain Coordination of Retailers with Endogenous Preferences under Revenue Sharing Contracts

作　　者：易灵燕 杨宽[1] 周英告[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082 [2]中南大学数学与统计学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《系统工程》2014年第2期78-83,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71031004);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272209);教育部人文科学研究规划项目(12YJA630170);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(12JJ3081);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(11HDSK306)

摘　　要：研究由单个风险中性供应商和单个内生偏好零售商组成的二级供应链。其中内生偏好零售商在出现损失时以指数衰减最快扭亏,类似于损失规避的零售商。通过建立收益共享契约,利用最大衰减函数理论进行建模,将零售商的内生偏好特征定量化,探讨分散化供应链中的最优订购问题,揭示损失规避特性以及收益共享契约参数对零售商最优订购量的影响。通过研究发现:内生偏好零售商的损失规避系数趋于零时相当于风险中性零售商,且当损失规避系数和批发价格增加时,零售商最优订购量相应减少;而收益共享系数增加时,最优订购量增加;且收益共享契约能使供应链达到协调状态并取得相关参数取值范围。通过算例对相关结论进行数值分析,结果显示其研究成果能够得到数值验证。This paper does research on two-stage supply chains which consist of individual risk neutral supplier and single retailer similar to the loss averse retailer at the time of the loss of exponential attenuation with the fastest turnaround. The establishment of revenue sharing contract and the maximum attenuation function theory for modeling and the quantitative characteristics of endogenous preference are to explore the optimal ordering problem in the decentralized supply chain and reveal the impact of loss aversion and revenue sharing contract parameters on the retailer＇s optimal order quantity. Meanwhile, relevant conclusions are drawn that when endogenous preference retaile＇s loss aversion coefficient approaches to zero, it is equivalent to the risk neutral retailer and the retailer＇s optimal order quantity decreases with the enhancement of the loss aversion coefficient and wholesale prices, increases with raising revenue sharing coefficient. Moreover, this study finds that the supply chain can achieve the state of coordination with revenue sharing contract and get the range of parameters in the contract. In the end, the results of numerical examples verify the validity of the proposed method.

关 键 词：内生偏好 供应链协调 收益共享契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]