企业研发团队成员过程冲突进化博弈研究  

Process Conflict Evolution Game Research of the R& D Team Members

作　　者：万涛[1] 周宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安工业大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710032

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第2期233-237,302,共6页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072158);陕西省教育厅2013年科学研究计划项目(2013JK0188)

摘　　要：在研发团队中,适度的过程冲突,对团队的有效性有促进的作用,然而,过多的过程冲突,会影响团队的有效性。针对这一现实问题,建立了以成员自身利益为博弈核心的过程冲突进化博弈模型,研究结果表明:当企业研发团队成员选择冲突的净收益大于选择合作的超额收益时,成员在长期进化学习的过程中,都会慢慢的采取冲突的策略;当企业研发团队成员选择冲突的净收益小于选择合作的超额收益时,在成员长期的进化学习过程中,也无法借助博弈方成员的学习能力,达到百分百彼此合作的最佳策略组合。但是可以参考模型给出的公式,对研发过程中成员的损益进行调节控制,从而把冲突维持在一个适度的水平,达到使成员内部保持合作的目的。In the R D team,moderate process conflicts have played a promoting role in the effective- ness of the team.However,too many process conflicts will affect the effectiveness of the team.To solve this problem,a game core process conflict of evolutionary model was established for the members own interests.The results of the study show that： when the R~ D team members choice conflict of net earnings are more than cooperative excess earnings, the members in the long term evolution of the learning process,will slowly take conflict strategy;When the R^D team members choice conflict of net income are less than cooperative excess earnings, the members cannot achieve the best strategy combination in cooperation with each other in the long term of evolution in learning process even with the game party member＇s study ability.However,we can refer to the given formula of the model,adjust the members＇ income, so as to keep the conflicts at a moderate level to keep the interior cooperation.

关 键 词：企业研发团队 过程冲突 进化博弈 稳定策略 

分 类 号：F243.2[经济管理—劳动经济]