悲观归纳、新归纳和未被设想的替代者问题  

Pessimistic Induction, New Induction and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives

作　　者：宋志润[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学公共管理学院,广州510006

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2014年第5期3-8,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：科学实在论与反实在论之争是科学哲学研究的热点。斯马特、普特南等人提出奇迹论证为科学理论成功与真理的关系辩护,劳丹等人基于科学史案例提出悲观归纳论证加以反驳。围绕科学理论所设定的实体以及理论是否趋真等问题两个阵营争论不断,美国学者P.凯尔·斯坦福在悲观归纳论证基础上,提出科学史的新归纳以及未被设想的替代者问题等新的论证,质疑科学实在论。悲观归纳和新归纳虽同为归纳,但侧重点不同。斯坦福的未被设想的替代者问题颇具深意。Scientific realists put forward the no miracle argument to defend the relationship between success of scientific theories and truth. L. Laudan and other authors confute realism by pessimistic induction based on the history of science. Kyle Stanford makes an argument, the new induction over the history of science, and the conception of uneonceived alternatives, to question the scientific realism .The new induction is different from pes- simistic induction, and the problem of unconceived alternatives deserves careful pondering.

关 键 词：凯尔·斯坦福 新归纳 未被设想的替代者 悲观归纳 反实在论 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]