税收竞争、财政支出压力与地方非税收入增长  

Tax Competition,Fiscal Pressure and the Non-tax Revenue Expansion of Local Governments

作　　者：王佳杰[1] 童锦治[1] 李星[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学财政系

出　　处：《财贸经济》2014年第5期27-38,共12页Finance & Trade Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"健全公共财政体系研究"(10zd&36)

摘　　要：继"税收超经济增长"之后,地方政府非税收入规模的超常增长已成为新的财税研究热点。本文以此为分析对象,在中国式分权模式下构建地方政府财政收支决策模型,探讨地方税收竞争、公共支出压力与非税收入增加之间的内在关系,继而利用2000—2011年省际动态面板数据验证相关推论。结论表明,政府间税收竞争强度、以及地方财政支出压力的增加,均会导致非税收入规模的扩大;而通过提高财政收入分权水平,提升地方收入自给率,则能够抑制地方对非税收入的依赖。最后,本文就合理管控地方非税收入规模提出了相关的建议。While the over-GDP increasing tax revenue remains as one critical topic for economic studies, the extraordinary growth of local non-tax revenue has turned out to be the new hotspot. Targeting at the later issue, this paper attempts to construct a budget decision model under China＇s decentralization framework, so as to clarify the interaction between inter-governmental tax competition, public expenditure pressure and the growth in non-tax revenue, with corresponding empirical test based on the provincial data from 2000 to 2011. It has been revealed that the rise in the intensity of tax competition and fiscal pressure would promote the expansion of non-tax revenue, while the increase of revenue self- sufficiency could produce opposite effects. As a sum, policy implication is proposed concerning the reasonable control of non-tax revenue.

关 键 词：财政分权 非税收入 税收竞争 财政支出压力 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]