基于演化博弈的环境信息披露监管研究  

A Study of Environmental Information Disclosure Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：贾敬全[1,2] 卜华[1] 姚圣[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116 [2]淮北师范大学经济学院,安徽淮北235000

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2014年第5期145-148,共4页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102163)

摘　　要：考虑到政府监管部门与公司均为有限理性参与人,文章通过构建环境信息披露演化博弈模型,分析政府环境信息披露监管部门和公司的策略变化及演化趋势,并针对达到的演化博弈稳定状态进行分析。结果表明:环境信息披露监管的稳定状态与公司环境信息披露的成本、政府环境信息披露监管成本、处罚力度等因袭密切相关。根据分析结果,提出针对环境信息披露监管的政策建议。The paper constructs an evolutionary game model of environmental information disclosure, analyzes policy changes and evolutionary trends of government＇s environmental information disclosure regulatory departments and companies, and also makes an analysis on the steady state of evolutionary game, considering both government＇s regulatory departments and compa nies are limited rational participants. The results show that： the steady state of environmental information disclosure supervi sion is closelv related to costs of corporate environmental information disclosure, supervision costs of government environmen tal information disclosure, the degree of punishment, etc. Finally, the paper puts forward some policy recommendations for environmental information disclosure supervision based on the analysis results.

关 键 词：演化博弈 环境信息披露 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]