制造商供应量变化时同质多物品拍卖价格策略研究  

Research on Multiple Units Auction with Variable Supply of Manufacturers

作　　者：谭建[1] 王先甲[2] 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学管理科学与工程管理学院,贵州贵阳550004 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《西华大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2014年第3期66-70,共5页Journal of Xihua University(Philosophy & Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(批准资助号:71231007;71071119);贵州省科学技术基金(批准资助号:黔科合J字[2013]2085号);贵州省2013年度社科规划课题(批准资助号:13GZYB29)

摘　　要：本文分析了制造商供应量变化时、在多个零售商非单位需求情形下的统一价格拍卖与歧视价格拍卖,得到了两种拍卖方式下零售商的报价策略、制造商的价格策略及其相关性质。结果表明:统一价格拍卖中,零售商在低价时所提交数量高于其真实需求,在高价时所提交数量低于其真实需求。歧视价格拍卖中零售商在低价会选择提交自己真实的需求量,在高价会选择提交低于真实的需求量。若参与拍卖的零售商越多,相对歧视价格拍卖,统一价格拍卖提交的需求量扭曲越少,从机制设计的角度来看,制造商更倾向于用统一价格拍卖的方式进行产品批发。We have analyzed uniform price and price discrimination multiple auction separately with variable supply of manufacturers when multiple retailers have non-unit demand to obtain the bidding strategy of the retailers, the pricing strategy of manufacturers and its related properties. The comparison result between the two kinds of auction indicates that： For the uniform price auction, the quantities that retailers submit is above its real demand at the lower price, while below their true demand quantity at the higher price. For the discrimination price auction, the quantities that retailers submit equals their real demand at the lower price, while below their true demand quantity at the higher price. Contrast to price discrimination auction, the more retailers participate in the auction, the less distortion of quantity submitted by retailers. From mechanism design viewpoint, manufacturers tend to adopt uniform price auction for its wholesale products.

关 键 词：供应量变化 统一价格拍卖 歧视价格拍卖 多物品 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]