最优股权结构与公司价值——理论模型与来自中国的经验证据  

Optimal Equity Structure and Corporate Value——Theoretical Model and the Empirical Evidence from China

作　　者：魏熙晔[1] 张前程[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2014年第3期92-103,127,共12页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：本文基于委托-代理理论和博弈论的视角,构建了最优股权结构模型,从理论上证明了存在最优股权结构。利用2006-2012年中国804家上市公司的面板数据检验了股权结构与企业价值的关系。理论分析与经验证据一致:公司价值与股权集中度呈倒U型关系,公司价值与非控股大股东股权比例也呈倒U型关系;公司价值与股权制衡度显著负相关。实证结果还发现:中国上市公司整体上治理水平不佳,董事会独立性不高,管理层薪酬与公司绩效并不十分匹配;国家作为控制人,其公司价值明显更低。本文认为,一个现代公司最优股权结构为:前十大股东股权集中度在50%附近,其余为分散型的中小股东;第一大股东比例不宜超过20%,以保证大股东间相互制衡作用。Based on the perspective of the principal-agent theory and the game theory,this paper develops one model on optimal ownership structure. We investigate the equity structure and corporate value by using the panel data of 804 corporations in China's stock market from 2006-2012. Firstly,the empirical results show that the corporate value is displaged by strong inverse US hape curve on ownership concentration. The corporate value is also showh by a inverse US hape curve on the equity ratio of outside blockholders. Secondly,we also find the corporate value is negative relative to ownership balance. Thirdly,we find that China's corporate governance is not very successful,including the independence of the board and the salary incentive mechanism.Finally,the state-owned enterprise is significantly negative by incentive to corporate performance. Accordingly,we propose one modern corporation has optimal ownership structure. The optimal ownership concentration of the top ten shareholders is about 50%,while the other share is dispersed by minority shareholders. The share of controlling shareholders should not exceed 20% to ensure the sharing control and monitoring between large shareholders.

关 键 词：股权集中 股权制衡 治理机制 公司价值 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]