收购兼并、异质股东与企业绩效  

M&A,Heterogeneous Shareholder and Business Performance

作　　者：李晓良[1] 温军[1] 吕光桦[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710069

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2014年第3期104-111,127-128,共8页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：本文在交易成本经济学的理论框架下纳入了股东异质性因素并按照资产专用性的不同对并购进行了界分,籍此探讨了关系型股东与企业并购的匹配关系,并基于2004-2011年1584家中国上市公司的数据对此进行了实证分析。研究发现:国有关系型持股仅在国有企业中随着并购交易资产专用性的增加而出现显著增加,对较高资产专用性的并购具有显著的积极治理效应;民营关系型持股同样仅在国有企业中与并购资产专用性存在正相关关系,对较高资产专用性的并购也具有显著的积极治理效应;全样本中机构持股随着企业并购资产专用性的增加而显著增加,对较高资产专用性的并购具有显著的积极治理效应,而且这种现象在民营企业中表现地更为明显。最后,本文还就如何提高不同类型企业的并购效率提出了相应的政策建议。This article incorporates the factor of heterogeneity of shareholders into the framework of theory of transaction cost economics and makes the division of mergers and acquisitions in accordance with different asset specificity to explore the matching relationship between relational shareholders and enterprise merger and acquisition,then followed by the empirical analysis of the data of 1584 Chinese listed companies from 2004 to2011. The Results are as follows: The state-owned ownership only increases significantly with the asset specificity of M&A' trade in state-owned enterprises,which produces an active governance effect on the merger and acquisition of high asset specificity. The private-owned ownership only increases significantly with the asset specificity of M&A' trade in state-owned enterprises,which produces an active governance effect on the merger and acquisition of high asset specificity. The institutional ownership increases significantly with the asset specificity of M&A trade,which also produces an active governance effect on the merger and acquisition of high as-set specificity. This phenomenon in private enterprises is found to be more noticeable. Finally,this article also puts forward some relative policy suggestions on how to improve the efficiency of merger and acquisition among various types of enterprises.

关 键 词：异质股东 收购兼并 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F276.6