供应链中的知情委托方契约机制设计  

Contract mechanism design of informed principal in supply chain

作　　者：鄢仁秀[1] 汪贤裕[1] 郭红梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学商学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2014年第4期971-978,共8页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071103);四川大学青年启动基金资助项目(2012SCU11015)~~

摘　　要：为解决供应链中委托人的信息不对称问题,将选择性契约作为知情委托人传递自身私人信息的信号。考虑由一个制造商与一个拥有私人销售能力信息的销售商组成的二级供应链,建立了信号传递模型并分析了发行博弈的完美贝叶斯均衡。结果表明,在一定的条件下,低信息密度最优配置使委托人产生了信号成本,是发行博弈唯一的完美贝叶斯均衡。当不满足均衡唯一性条件时,分析了知情委托人的事中有效配置,发现此时发行博弈的均衡配置集(弱)Pareto占优于低信息密度最优配置。以算例的形式验证了结论的有效性。To solve the information asymmetry of the principal in supply chain, the option contract was introduced as the principal＇s signal to inform the agent. By considering a two-stage supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and one retailer who had private sales ability information, the signaling model was built and the Perfect Bayesian Equilib- rium （PEE） was analyzed. It proved that the signaling cost of principal was created by Low-Information-Intensity （LII） optimum allocation, which was the unique PBE in some conditions. Furthermore, the informed principal＇s in- terim-efficient allocation was analyzed if LII optimum was not the unique PBE, at which Pareto-dominate （weakly） equilibrium configuration set was superior to LII. The effectiveness of proposed method was verified by numerical examples.

关 键 词：供应链 知情委托人 选择性契约 低信息密度最优 事中有效 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]