终极股东控制、私募股权资本与IPO抑价——来自我国中小板IPO公司的经验证据  

The Ultimate Shareholders' Control,Private Equity Capital and IPO Underpricing: Empirical Evidence from China's Small and Medium-sized Board IPO Companies

作　　者：张华 尹顺达 曲世友 韩东平 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学(威海)经济管理学院,山东威海264209

出　　处：《预测》2014年第3期57-62,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：山东省软科学研究计划资助项目(2013RKA10001);山东省高校科技计划资助项目(2010RKGB1121);山东省发改委蓝黄"两区"重大课题(2012-L-23)

摘　　要：为了研究IPO公司的终极控股股东对IPO抑价的影响，本文选取了2007—2011年中小板IPO公司的数据，通过实证研究发现IPO的抑价水平与终极控股股东的控制权和现金流权的偏离程度负相关，但如果公司在IPO前引入私募股权资本，会使得这种负相关关系减弱。研究结论说明了在IPO公司中控制权·现金流权的偏离程度越大。终极控股股东越倾向于IPO高定价，降低抑价水平，但由于私募股权资本并不能起到监督和认证作用，使得押价水平提高。The study is to show how the company＇ s ultimate controlling shareholder exerts influence on IPO underpricing by employing the collected data of IPO companies in small and medium-sized board from the year 2007 to 2011. The em- pirical evidence supports the findings that the IPO underpricing level is inversely associated with the degree of deviation of control-cash flow fight of the ultimate controlling shareholder, however the introduction of private equity capital prior to the IPO would contribute to weakening of this negative correlation relation to a certain extent. The research findings also indicate that the greater degree of deviation of control-cash flow right gets, the more incentive the ultimate control- ling shareholders will have to improve IPO offer price, thus to reduce the level of underpricing, whereas the private equity capital fails to work efficiently in terms of certification and supervision, which consequently results in the highented underpricing level.

关 键 词：终极控股股东 私募股权资本 IPO抑价 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]