高管股权激励与银行信贷决策——基于我国民营上市公司的经验证据  

Executive Stock Incentives and Bank Credit Decisions——Empirical Evidence from Private Public Firms in China

作　　者：胡国强[1] 盖地[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院,300222

出　　处：《会计研究》2014年第4期58-65,96,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272189;71302114);国家社会科学基金青年项目(13CGL034);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(12YJA790193);天津财经大学科研发展基金(Q130216)的资助

摘　　要：本文实证考察我国民营上市公司高管股权激励对银行信贷决策的影响。研究发现,高管股权激励强度越高,公司获得的银行借款越多,但主要体现在短期借款增加,而长期借款没有显著增加。进一步研究发现,相比实施经营持股激励的公司,实施股票期权或限制性股票激励的公司获得显著更多的银行借款尤其是短期借款,而长期借款在两类公司不存在显著差异;相比激励型股权激励公司,福利型股权激励公司获得显著更多的短期借款。研究证实,高管激励机制的完善有助于民营企业获得更多银行借款,缓解"信贷歧视",但面对股权激励的风险承担效应与福利效应,银行会通过调整贷款期限来降低自身的信贷风险。This paper empirical examines the impact of executive stock incentives( ESI) in China's private public firms on bank credit decisions. Results show that,the stronger intensity of ESI,the more bank borrowings firms obtain,but which are only for short- term borrowings rather than long- term borrowings. Further,we find that firms with stock options or restricted stock incentives significantly obtain more bank borrowings especial short- term borrowings than firms with stock ownership incentives; compared to firms with incentive- oriented ESI,firms with welfare- oriented EST obviously obtain more short- term borrowings. This paper confirms that,the improvement of ESI are helpful for China's private firms to obtain more banks borrowings and thus relieve credit discrimination,however,banks reduce their credit risk by adjusting the loan period while facing risk- taking effects and welfare effects of ESI.

关 键 词：高管股权激励 银行信贷决策 信号传递 风险承担 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F832.4F224