董事会职能与管理者短期主义行为倾向:企业长期目标导向的调节作用  

The Board Function and the Short-termism of the Administrators: Long-goal Orientation As a Moderator

作　　者：汪丽[1] 徐志坚[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《经济经纬》2014年第3期97-101,共5页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70902006)

摘　　要：管理者为了取得短期业绩而主动"选择"做出损害企业长期价值的管理短期主义决策问题普遍存在而又无法彻底解决。为检验董事会监督和建议职能对解决管理者短期主义行为问题的有效性,笔者以182家企业为研究样本,采用层级回归的方法进行实证研究,结果显示,拥有长期目标导向的企业,其董事会的监督职能可能激发管理短期主义问题,而董事会的建议职能对管理短期主义行为的抑制作用显著。研究结论揭示了公司治理对企业短期主义行为的影响机制,认为中国企业应该通过完善董事会的职能倾向来解决长期创新不足问题。Short-termism means managers damage the long-term value to promote short-term performance, which is a common problem and can＇ t be solved thoroughly. This paper focuses on the effectiveness of the board functions to solve the short-termism problem in China. With 182 companies as samples, using hierarchical regression methods, the empirical results indicate that the monitoring of the board of directors may inspire short-termism and the consulting function can inhibit short-term behavior significantly in the long goal ori- ented enterprises. The study reveals the mechanism of corporate governance affect short-termism behavior, and suggests Chinese enter- prises to solve the problem of insufficient long-term innovation by improving consulting function of the board of directors.

关 键 词：董事会 短期主义 监督职能 建议职能 长期目标导向 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]