基于双寡头垄断模型的垄断国有企业改革分析  

An Analysis on the Reform of the State-owned Monopoly Enterprises Based on the Duopoly Model

作　　者：陈俊龙[1] 汤吉军[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学秦皇岛分校经贸学院,河北秦皇岛066004 [2]吉林大学中国国有经济研究中心,吉林长春130012

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2014年第6期97-101,共5页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD022);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(12JJD790028);河北省软科学计划项目(134576138D)

摘　　要：国有企业垄断是一个经济学问题,与所有制性质没有必然关系,需要从理性的经济学视角来审视。基于中国国情,从由国有企业构成的双寡头垄断市场出发,分析并比较由国有企业、私有企业及混合所有制企业组合而成的各种双寡头垄断市场的价格、产量及社会福利。可以发现,私有化对社会福利的提升作用是有条件的,完全的私有化未必能提升社会福利;在当前的社会经济条件下,混合所有制是解决国有企业垄断问题可行、务实的途径,其股权结构十分重要。SOEs monopoly is an economic issue rather than the ownership issue, which needs to be studied from the perspective of rational economics. Based on China＇ s national conditions and taking the duopoly markets of SOEs as the starting point, the paper analyzes and compares market prices, output and social welfare of various duopoly markets which consist of state-owned enterprises, private enterprises and mixed ownership enterprises. It finds that the effect of privatization on promotion of social welfare is conditional, and the entire privatization may not be able to improve social welfare. Under the current social and economic conditions, the mixed ownership, whose shareholding structure is essential, is a feasible and practical way to solve the SOEs monopoly.

关 键 词：双寡头垄断 国有企业 混合所有制 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]