基于微分博弈的二级猪肉供应链质量行为协调机制研究  

Coordination Mechanism of Quality Behavior in Two-echelon Pork Supply Chain Based on Differential Game

作　　者：夏兆敏[1,2] 孙世民[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学工商管理学院,山东济南250014 [2]山东农业大学经济管理学院,山东泰安271018

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2014年第2期198-205,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972121);山东省"三农"问题软科学研究基地项目;山东省生猪产业创新团队建设项目(SDAIT-06-011-10)

摘　　要：运用微分博弈方法研究了由单一生猪屠宰加工企业和单一超市构成的二级猪肉供应链质量行为协调机制。首先考察并比较了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈以及协同合作博弈情形下屠宰加工企业和超市的最优质量行为决策,研究结果表明协同合作决策模式下,屠宰加工企业和超市的质量行为以及猪肉供应链总体利润均严格优于在非合作决策模式下的相应值。然后导出了能够使屠宰加工企业和超市的个体利润达到帕累托最优,进而实现双方质量行为协调的供应链总体利润分配系数的取值范围。Coordination mechanism of quality behaviors in two-echelon pork supply chain composed of a slaughtering and processing company and a supermarket is researched by means of differential game. The slaughtering and processing company＇s and supermarket＇s optimal quality behavioral decisions in the Nash non-cooperative game,Stackelberg leader-follower game,and coordinated cooperative game are investigated respectively. And then the feedback equilibrium outcomes in the four game structure are comparatively analyzed. The results show that,the slaughtering and processing company＇s and supermarket＇s quality behaviors,the pork supply chain＇s profit in the coordinated game are superior to those in the non-cooperative game. And the value range of distribution coefficient of pork supply chain ＇s profit is proposed to achieve Pareto optimality of individual profits of slaughtering and processing company and supermarket,and thus coordination of quality behaviors.

关 键 词：猪肉供应链 质量行为 微分博弈 协调机制 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]