创业投资的治理作用:基于代理成本视角的实证分析  

The Governance Effect of Venture Capital:An Empirical Analysis from the Perspective of Agency Cost

作　　者：蔡地[1] 陈振龙[1] 陈志军[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,济南250100

出　　处：《管理科学》2014年第3期50-60,共11页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71302090);中国博士后科学基金(2013M531622);山东大学自主创新基金(2013GN005)~~

摘　　要：选取2004年至2012年中国沪、深两市首次公开发行上市的1 216家公司作为研究对象,采用相关分析、多元回归分析和工具变量等多种统计分析方法,从代理成本视角探讨创业投资对中国上市公司的治理作用。从总体上检验创业投资参与对中国上市公司代理成本的影响,进一步检验创业投资的参与程度和背景特征是否影响其治理作用的发挥。研究结果表明,有创业投资机构参与的上市公司,其代理成本显著低于无创业投资机构参与的上市公司;创业投资的参与程度越深,即创业投资机构家数越多、持股比例越高、投资期限越长,上市公司的代理成本就越低;与本土背景的创业投资机构相比,外资背景的创业投资机构更能降低上市公司的代理成本。研究结论对上市公司、创业投资机构和政策制定者具有重要借鉴意义和参考价值。Selecting 1216 IPO firms on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange during 2004-2012 as the object of the study, this paper analyzes the effect of venture capital （VC） on corporate governance in the Chinese listed firm from the agency cost per- spective by applying correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis, and instrumental variable methods. The paper firstly ex- amines the overall effect of venture capital involvement on the agency cost of Chinese listed firm, and then examines whether this effect depends on the involvement level and thebackground of VCs. The empirical results show that： ①as a whole, compared with non-VC backed firms, VC backed firms have significantly lower agency cost; ②the lower agency cost can be attained when the VC＇s involvement is deeper, a situation happened with large numbers of VCs investing in the same company; high VC＇s shareholding, or long VC＇s investment horizon; and ③compared with domestic VCs, VCs with foreign background plays a stronger role in reducing the agency cost.

关 键 词：创业投资 代理成本 公司治理 上市公司 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]