议价的OEM供应链在随机供需下的协调决策  

Coordination in a price-negotiable OEM supply chain with random supply and random demand

作　　者：陈志明[1] 陈志祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广州510275

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2014年第5期43-51,共9页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972079)

摘　　要：品牌企业在与OEM供应商建立合作关系前,需要经过议价谈判达成交易意向,并且在做生产订货决策时,需要考虑需求与供应的随机性带来的风险.随机需求源于难以预测市场消费,随机供应来自产品质量缺陷等原因,供需两端的随机性无疑给企业决策增添了难度.针对议价谈判中存在的信息不对称,提出了基于Bayesian博弈的议价谈判模型,证明了存在一个均衡价格,该价格是双方达成交易意向的最佳条件.而后,根据需求和供应的随机性特点,构建了分散决策下品牌企业和OEM供应商的利润函数,证明了该函数是凹函数,运用Stackelberg博弈求解出双方的最优批量决策.分析了集中决策下OEM供应链的利润最大化条件,以此为优化目标,引入带缺货惩罚的额外收购契约.品牌企业可以根据OEM供应商的生产数量实行缺货惩罚或额外收购,通过调整契约的参数,实现OEM供应链协调.In this paper, we consider a decentralized supply chain that consists of one original equipment man- ufacturer（OEM） and one contract manufacturer（CM）. In order to conclude a business, the OEM needs to bargain with the CM and to consider the risks from the random demand of customers and the random supply of the CM. Since the selling prices of both parties are private information in the bargaining game to get the equilibrium prices which give each party the maximum utility. cavity of the expected profit of the OEM and the CM, and model a Stackelberg , we model a Bayesian Then, we demonstrate the con- game to get the optimal ordering and production decisions. Finally, we propose a contract combining shortage penalty and surplus purchase to coordinate the supply chain. By adjusting the contract＇ s parameters, we can make the decentralized supply chain＇ s profit equal the maximum profit under the centralized setting.

关 键 词：供应链协调 博弈论 议价 随机供应 随机需求 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]