独立性与审计期望差距的博弈分析  

The Game Theory of the Gap between Independence and Audit Expectation

作　　者：赵立三[1] 刘伯英[2] 

机构地区：[1]河北大学会计发展研究中心,河北保定071002 [2]河北大学管理学院,河北保定071002

出　　处：《河北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2014年第3期105-109,共5页Journal of Hebei University(Philosophy and Social Science)

摘　　要：审计制度的建立对资本市场的健康发展至关重要,而其核心是审计的独立性。独立审计是公司外部治理的重要组成部分,唯有保持审计独立性,注册会计师才能发现和报告特定的违约行为。因此,保证审计质量、满足审计期望、缩小审计期望差距的核心是审计的独立性。运用泽尔腾"颤抖手精炼均衡"的静态博弈对审计博弈过程中政府监管、公司改聘权、审计收费等影响注册会计师独立性的因素进行博弈分析,为政府监管、市场选择提供理论依据,以此遏制财务造假案件的再次发生。The establishment of audit system is vital for the healthy development of the capital market, and the core issue of audit system is the independence of auditing. The independent audit is an important mechanism of external corporate governance. Only by maintaining auditor independence, can the auditors find and report the particular breach of contract. Therefore, the auditor independence is the core issue for assuring audit quality, fulfilling audit expectations, and narrowing the audit expectation gap. This article will use the static game ＂trembling hand perfect equilibrium＂ which is created by Selten to analyze the factors, such as government regulation, CPA transforming accounting firms, the right of changing CPA, audit fees, etc. , which are on the audit expectation. This research can provide a theoretical basis for government regulation, in order to curb the recurrence of financial cases.

关 键 词：审计制度 审计独立性 审计期望差距 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]