交互关系下的产品市场竞争与控制权配置治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司数据的实证分析  

A Study on Product Market Competition and the Governance Effect of Control Right Allocation from the Perspective of Interaction:an Empirical Test with the Listed Companies Data in China

作　　者：周瑜胜[1,2] 宋光辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学管理学院,广东广州510641 [2]广东外语外贸大学管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2014年第5期61-73,共13页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(12CJY006);教育部人文社会科学基金规划项目(10YJA630131)

摘　　要：本文研究了交互视角下公司控制权配置在产品市场差异化竞争条件下的治理效应。以中国资本市场上市公司2003—2011年数据为样本,研究产品市场竞争与控制权配置在交互关系下的共同治理效应,实证表明,中国产品市场竞争与公司控制权配置变量之间只有较弱的替代关系,产品市场竞争在抑制公司控制权配置中大股东代理的负面效应方面作用有限,中国市场条件下控制大股东代理问题主要依赖对控制权配置的有效设计,从而增加对大股东的有效制衡。The paper studies the governance effect of control right allocation from the perspecive of interaction in the situation of product market differentiation. Taking china＇s capital market data from 2003 to 2011 as the sample, the paper discusses the governance effect in terms of interaction between product market competition and control right allocation. Evidence shows that there is only relatively weak substitute relation between product market competition and control right allocation in china, and product market competition only has little role in controlling the negative effects of majority shareholder proxy in corporate control right allocation. In china, it depends on the effective control right design to control the major shareholder proxy problem, and increase the checks to the major shareholders.

关 键 词：市场竞争 控制权 控制权配置 大股东代理 

分 类 号：F271.2[经济管理—企业管理]