产权性质、高管控制权与并购绩效——基于内部控制有效性的研究  

Nature of Property Rights,Executive Control Rights and M & A Performance: A Study on the Effectiveness Based on Internal Control

作　　者：周林子[1] 胡珺[1] 胡国柳[1] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院,海南海口570228

出　　处：《海南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2014年第3期107-113,120,共8页Journal of Hainan University （Humanities & Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71062009);教育部新世纪人才支持计划项目(NCET-10-0123)

摘　　要：以2011年成功实施并购的主并上市公司为样本,基于产权性质视角探讨内部控制、高管控制权与并购绩效的内在关系。研究结果表明:高管控制权膨胀导致上市公司并购绩效降低,且相对于非国有控股公司,国有控股公司更为强烈;完善的内部控制体系有助于并购绩效的提升,但在国有控股公司,现阶段内部控制尚不能约束高管控制权导致的绩效损害;与之相反,在非国有控股公司,内部控制在一定程度上能够限制高管控制权,提高并购绩效。With the Chinese listed companies that succeeded in implementing mergers and acquisition in 2011as the samples,the paper explores the internal relationship among internal control,executive control rights and M A performance under perspective of the nature of property rights. The results show that the over-expansion of executive control rights reduces the M A performance of listed companies,and the state-owned holding companies behave more strongly with respect to the non-state-owned ones. While the sound internal control system helps to improve the M A performance,the internal control still fails to constrain the performance damage caused by executive control rights at present. In the non-state-owned holding companies,conversely,the internal control can constrain executive control rights and improve M A Performance to a certain extent.

关 键 词：产权性质 内部控制 高管控制权 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]