债务约束、经理薪酬与上市公司过度投资研究  

Debt Constraint, Executive Compensation and Listed Companies' Over-investment

作　　者：田利辉[1] 李春霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学金融发展研究院,天津300071

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2014年第6期46-52,共7页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：教育部重大课题攻关项目(13JZD006);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272179);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-12-0288)的支持

摘　　要：众多文献指出，负债和经理激励能够相互作用，影响企业价值。但是，影响企业价值的中间作用机制是怎样的？负债和经理激励是否改变公司的投资行为？分析中国深沪两市1999～2012年间上市公司数据，本文探讨了负债和经理薪酬在影响过度投资问题上的相互关系。我们发现，负债和经理薪酬有助于减少公司的过度投资行为；并且，二者对过度投资的影响表现为互补关系。我们进一步发现，企业的产权性质和地区的金融发展水平影响着负债和经理薪酬的治理效应。我们主张，外部治理和内部治理应该携手并进，负债水平与经理薪酬可以组合设计，进而有效约束我国企业的过度投资行为，提升上市公司价值。Studies have shown that the debt and executive compensation interact to firm value, but there are short of empirical evidence to investigate the intermediate mechanism. Using the data of Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2012, we examine how the debt and compensation interact to the over-investment issue. We find that increased debt and manager incentives help reduce corporate over-investment. The interaction between debt and managerial incentives is complementary as for the problem of over-investment. We also find that the relationship is different under different ownership and level of financial development. We suggest that the internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance can work together to reduce the over-investment problem and therefore increase corporate value.

关 键 词：经理人激励 过度投资 公司治理 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]