中国县级政府税收竞争研究  

A Study of Tax Competition at County-level in China

作　　者：杨龙见[1] 尹恒[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院 [2]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《统计研究》2014年第6期42-49,共8页Statistical Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"公共支出间横向影响及支出责任纵向划分:基于中国市县级数据的研究"(71173019);"税收;财政补助与企业生产率:基于微观数据的研究"(71373026);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划"公共财政与收入分配"(NECT-11-0041);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助

摘　　要：税收竞争是地方政府财政竞争的常见方式。为吸引税基,放松税收征管力度是其主要表现形式。理论模型表明地方政府不同策略行为取决于相对税率的权衡;政府间不同的资本税率弹性导致了实际税率的分化。本文利用空间计量方法分析了中国县级政府的税收竞争行为,发现相邻县存在显著的策略互补(税收模仿);异质性政府税率存在差异,贫穷县的实际税率要高于富裕县。纠正扭曲的税收征管策略和提升市场保护激励是未来改革的关键。Tax competition is one of the common methods of the competition among the local governments. In order to attract the tax base, loosens the efforts on tax coLLecting is the main form of competition. Theoretical model demonstrates that different strategies behaviors of counties depend on the governments＇ relative rates. The difference of tax rate of capital elasticity lead to actual tax rates divergence. We employ spatial econometric method to analyze the tax competition, an empirical analysis of the county-level panel data finds robust results： adjacent counties in the business tax rate have significant strategic complementarity behavior （tax mimicking）; heterogeneity of government tax rate has differences, the poor county is higher than the rich county. Correcting tax collection twist and improving incentive of market protection is the key of future reforms.

关 键 词：税收竞争 营业税 空间计量 

分 类 号：C812[社会学—统计学]