双重委托代理、股东优势与管理层激励契约——对食品类上市公司的实证研究  

Double Principal-Agent,Shareholder Superiority and Incentive Contract Design ——Empirical Study Based on Food Listed Companies

作　　者：任曙明[1] 孙飞[1] 王洪静 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学经济学院,辽宁大连116024 [2]一汽-大众汽车有限公司,吉林长春130000

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第2期44-49,共6页Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目:"基于纵向联盟的重大装备制造业升级路径及机制研究"(71103023);"搜索引擎市场结构的形成机理;影响与规制研究"(71003010);辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目:"利用邻近性促进企业间知识流动的政策设计与模式选择"(L12DJY062);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目:"买方压榨下配套企业技术升级机制研究"(DUT13RW309)

摘　　要：针对近期频发的食品安全事件,提炼了食品企业治理机制的双重任务、双重委托代理与股东优势三大特征,并构建了双重委托代理模型,探析对管理者的激励契约设计,并使用食品类上市公司的面板数据进行了实证检验。研究表明:食品企业普遍建立了与财务绩效相联系的薪酬激励机制;政府监管机构尚未对食品企业建立与安全绩效相关的正向激励机制;股东优势的存在,会降低股东激励系数变化幅度,增大政府监管机构负向激励系数变化幅度。In relation to recent food safety incidents ,we refined three features of corporate governance in food listed companies ：double task ,double principal-agent and shareholder superiority .We have developed a double principal-agent model analyzing the optimal incentive contract equilibrium conditions ,and made an empirical test with the panel data of food listed companies .The results show that food listed companies generally have established pay incentives mechanisms related to financial performance ,but the government has not established positive incentive mechanisms associated with food safety control .Shareholder superiority can decrease the magnitude of changes of shareholder positive incentive coefficient and increase the magnitude of changes of negative incentive coefficient of government regulators .

关 键 词：激励契约设计 股东优势 双重委托代理 财务绩效 食品质量安全 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]