创新企业与投资基金协同创新的对赌协议设计  

Design for Collaborative Innovation between Venture Funds and Innovative Enterprises Based on Valuation Adjustment Mechanism

作　　者：陈勇 黄波[2] 黄伟[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆科技发展战略研究院,重庆401123 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《西部论坛》2014年第4期95-100,共6页West Forum

基　　金：重庆市社会科学规划项目(2012YBCB055);重庆市教委重点研究项目(112081);重庆市教育科学规划项目(2012-GX-149)

摘　　要：对于高盈利创新项目,创新企业可以通过信号传递解决其与投资基金协同创新中的逆向选择问题,即通过对赌协议的设计将其与低盈利项目区分开来。当创新项目所获最高利润较大,或获得最高利润的概率较高,或创新企业投资比例较低时,创新企业可通过对赌协议促成与投资基金的协同创新。创新企业的最优对赌协议为:将其项目最高收益率作为对赌协议的目标收益率,若达不到目标收益率创新企业就放弃参与利润分配,若达到目标收益率则要求投资基金转让相应的利润分配权,以弥补其因市场环境差而达不到目标收益率所遭受的损失。As for innovative projects with high profit, the innovative enterprises can solve their reverse selectionproblem in their collaborative innovation with venture funds via signal transmission, i.e., the innovative projectswith high profit are separated from the ones with low profit by the design of valuation adjustment mechanism（VAM）. When the highest profit received by an innovative project is relatively bigger or the probability forharvesting the highest profit is relatively higher or the investment proportion of innovative enterprises is relativelylower, the innovative enterprises can boost the collaborative innovation with venture funds by VAM. The optimalVAM of the innovative enterprises is toregardthe highest earnings rate of their projects as the target earnings rate ofVAM, to give up the participation in the profit distribution if the target earnings rate can not be reached and torequest the venture funds for transferring the related profit distribution rights if the target earnings rate is not reachedso as to make up the loss because the target can not be reached under the adverse market environment.

关 键 词：协同创新 对赌协议 创新企业 投资基金 信号传递 逆向选择 市场环境 目标收益率 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224