论《正义论》中基本善的作用及其存在的必然性  

On the Function and the Inevitability of the Primary Good in the Theory of Justice

作　　者：张祖辽[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院,上海200433

出　　处：《中国石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第3期54-58,共5页Journal of China University of Petroleum (Edition of Social Sciences)

摘　　要：罗尔斯在其义务论的道德哲学中区分了两种善理论,即善的强理论(the thick theory of good)和善的弱理论(the thin theory of good)。前者以良序社会中的正当原则为基础,并在正当优先于善的义务论框架中被广泛讨论。后者则以基本善为核心范畴,以此构建其道德哲学的实践推理基础。不过,他对基本善的设定由于游离于其义务论框架之外而未能得到足够关注。然而,《正义论》对基本善的设定却是理论的必然。该理论在《正义论》中有两个应用层次:首先,它是罗尔斯的道德契约论的推理起点;其次,没有基本善的存在,罗尔斯提出的两个正义原则将难以在道德层面获得足够的稳定性。Rawls distinguished two kinds theories of good,which are the thick theory of good and the thin theory of good. The foundation of the thick theory of good is the principle of right,which was discussed widely in the frame of deontology meaning that right is prior to good. On the other side,the core category of the thin theory of good is the primary good and Rawls established his starting point of practical reasoning. And the theory of good hasn＆#39;t gained enough discussion because it is out of the framework of deontology. But the theory of primary good is unavoidable in the theory of justice. In the book,that theory has two existent levels. Firstly,it is the starting point for Rawls＆#39; practical reasoning;secondly,if the thin theory of good does not exist,it is hard for the two principles of right to gain its sufficient stability in the level of morality.

关 键 词：善的弱理论 基本善 正当原则 稳定性 

分 类 号：B712.6[哲学宗教—外国哲学]