高校风险信息公开与保密的策略选择研究  

Research on Strategy Selection in the Risk Information Disclosure and Secrecy of Higher Education

作　　者：马小琪[1] 

机构地区：[1]黑龙江大学信息资源管理研究中心,黑龙江哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《情报科学》2014年第7期134-138,共5页Information Science

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(11BTQ028);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(G201010);黑龙江省高等教育学会"十二五"教育科学研究规划课题(HGJXH B1110485);黑龙江大学创新团队支持计划(Hdtd2010-24);黑龙江省教育厅人文社科面上项目(12542204)

摘　　要：高校风险信息的公开与保密是处理高校信息公开与保密问题的重点内容。本文在运用满意理论,以及能体现在一定概率下高校的收益与损失偏好的累积前景理论基础上,构造高校风险信息公开博弈模型,并对风险信息公开与保密策略选择、影响风险信息公开的条件及可能出现的悖论问题进行了探讨。Disclosure and secrecy of risk information in higher education is one of the crucial part of dealing with the problem concerned. The paper, applying satisfaction theory and cumulative prospect theory which may express higher education＇ s benefit and loss preference under certain probability, establishes a disclosure game model of risk information in higher education. Based on analysis of the model, the paper researches on the strategy selection, the conditions that affect risk information disclosure, and paradox probably incurred in the problem.

关 键 词：高校 风险信息 信息公开 信息保密 累积前景理论 

分 类 号：G203[文化科学—传播学]