市场化进程、管理层权力与过度投资  

Market Development,Managerial Powerand Over-investment

作　　者：郭桂花[1] 王昕昕[1] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学经济与管理学院,新疆石河子832003

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2014年第5期65-68,129,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：本文采用2007年至2011年我国上市公司的数据,检验了管理层权力与过度投资之间的关系。研究发现,管理层权力与过度投资显著正相关。同时还发现,相对于非国有企业,国有企业中管理层权力与过度投资的正相关性更显著。管理层权力对过度投资的影响受到企业所在地区市场化进程的影响,随着市场化进程的推进,管理层权力与过度投资的正相关性受到制约,并且这种制约作用在非国有企业中更显著。Based on the background of market development, this thesis analyses data of listed companies from 2007 to 2011 to empirically test therelationship between managerial power and over-investment, finding out a positive correlation between them. Further studies show that positive correlation between managerial power and over-investment of state-owned enterprises is more significant than that of non-state-owned enterprises. The impact managerial power has on over-investment varies from the market development in the region, and the positive correlation between managerial power and over-investment gets suppressed alongwith the market development, which ismore typi calamong non-state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：市场化进程 管理层权力 产权性质 过度投资 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济]