高管报酬、机会主义盈余管理和审计费用——基于盈余管理异质性的视角  

Top Level Manager Incentives, Opportunistic Earnings Management and Audit Fees-Perspective from Heterogeneity of Earnings Management

作　　者：张娟[1,2] 黄志忠[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学会计系 [2]南京大学会计与财务研究院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2014年第3期74-83,93,共11页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372029)资助

摘　　要：本文基于审计费用对不同类型盈余管理的差异性反映,研究了高管货币薪酬和股权激励对机会主义盈余管理行为的影响。通过理论和实证分析,发现高管货币薪酬激励能显著抑制其机会主义盈余管理行为,降低审计费用对盈余管理的反映系数;但这种现象在高管拥有股权激励的情况下表现较弱。尤其是当民营上市公司高管持股比例较小时,股权激励反而导致高管的机会主义盈余管理行为增加,提高审计费用对盈余管理的反映系数。本文通过区分盈余管理的类型,有助于缓解高管报酬有效激励观和盈余管理风险观的理论争议。Previous literature documents various ways that top manager incentives affect earnings management. Effective incentive hypothesis proposes that high manager incentives can reduce earnings management, while earnings management risk hypothesis proposes that manager will increase earnings management to get more compensation. This article suggests introducing the heterogeneity of earnings management to extend our understanding of the association between manager incentives and the specific opportunistic earnings management. Based on the audit risks of various forms of earnings management, opportunistic earnings management leads to more audit fees than information-driving earnings management. Therefore, this article examines how the manager incentives affect the coefficient of responding from audit fees to earnings management, and both of the monetary compensation incentives and equity incentives are discussed. Employing the classic model of audit pricing constructed by Simunic（1980） and using the 7035 sample panel data of the Chinese listed enterprises from 2006 to 2012, it shows that high monetary compensation incentives can effectively inhibit the opportunistic earnings management, reducing the coefficient of responding from audit fees to earnings management. This supports the effective incentive hypothesis. However, equity incentives have much less reducing effects on the opportunistic earnings management, compared with the monetary compensation incentives. Moreover, the reducing effects of monetary compensation incentives on opportunistic earnings management may become weaker when the equity incentives given to managers increase. The reason is further explored and the result shows that for those enterprises, especially the private enterprises, giving only a small proportion of equity to managers, the coefficients of responding from audit fees to earnings management increase as the equity incentives grow, which implies that small equity incentives may lead to more instead of less opportunistic earnings manageme

关 键 词：高管报酬 股权激励 机会主义盈余管理 审计费用 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]