CEO激励提高了内部控制有效性吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据  

Do CEO Incentives Improve the Effectiveness of Internal Control?——Empirical Evidence from Listed State-Owned Enterprises

作　　者：逯东[1] 王运陈[1] 付鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,611130

出　　处：《会计研究》2014年第6期66-72,97,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71103147;71273212);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(JBK1207039);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"国有企业内部控制有效性研究:基于政治关联与CEO激励视角"的资助

摘　　要：本文以国有上市公司为样本,全面讨论了CEO激励对内部控制有效性的作用机制。研究发现,(1)给予CEO适度的超额薪酬激励和股权激励有助于内部控制有效性的提高;(2)与一般CEO相比,具有行政经历的CEO会削弱激励机制在内部控制有效性中的提升作用。本文的经验证据表明,CEO激励是现阶段提升内部控制有效性的关键,但国有上市公司尚存在的行政任命制度扭曲了市场化激励机制,削弱了内部控制有效性。Using the data of Chinese listed state- owned enterprises(SOE),the paper examines the impact of CEO incentives on the effectiveness of internal control. We find that,granting moderately excessive monetary payment and equity ownership to CEOs can enhance the effectiveness of internal control; compared to those counterparts without administrative experience,CEOs with administrative experience weaken the role of incentives in implementing effective internal control. The empirical evidence suggests that CEO incentives are critical to implement effective internal control. The existing practice of politically appointed CEOs in listed state- owned enterprises twists market- oriented incentive mechanism,which jeopardizes the effectiveness of internal control.

关 键 词：国有上市公司 CEO激励 内部控制有效性 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F276.1