成本和需求扰动时双渠道供应链的协调机制研究  

Research on Coordination Mechanisms of Dual-channel Supply Chains When Cost and Demand are Disrupted

作　　者：徐浩[1] 李佳川[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《预测》2014年第4期70-75,共6页Forecasting

摘　　要：本文研究了成本和需求扰动时,制造商拥有直销渠道的双渠道供应链的协调机制。对于集中式供应链,通过求解突发事件下供应链最大利润的Kuhn-Tucker条件,提出了双渠道供应链应对突发事件的最优策略;对于分散式供应链,基于Stackelberg动态博弈,推导了供应链重新协调时,两部定价协议所应满足的条件,从而证明了两部定价协议在成本和需求同时扰动的情况下依然能够协调供应链。This paper researches the coordination mechanism of a dual-channel supply chain with one manufacturer who owns direct sale channel. For the centralized supply chain, this paper proposes the optimal strategies by solving the Kuhn-Tucker condition of optimal profit of supply chain when cost and demand scale are disrupted. For the decentralized supply chain, by the dynamic Stackelberg game theory, a derivation of conditions which the tow-part tariff contract should be met when the supply chain is re-coordinated has been done. For that, this paper proves the redesigned agreement can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain under cost and demand scale disruption.

关 键 词：供应链 双渠道 协调机制 两部定价协议 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]