专用性、专有性与企业制度  

Specificity, Exclusiveness and Enterprise Institution

作　　者：杨瑞龙[1] 杨其静[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院,100872

出　　处：《经济研究》2001年第3期3-11,共9页Economic Research Journal

摘　　要：本文认为 ,虽然剩余索取权和控制权安排是企业制度的重要内容 ,但企业制度的本质却是如何创造和分配组织租金。现有文献往往含混地将“专用性”视为当事人获得组织租金的法理甚至经济基础 ,然而事实上 ,“专用性”不但不是当事人获得组织租金的谈判力基础 ,反而削弱了这一基础。基于此 ,我们提出当事人获得企业组织租金的谈判力基础应该是“专有性” ,并且这一变量极大地影响着企业制度的选择和演变。总之 ,我们认为现实中的企业制度安排并非是社会福利最大化或交易费用最小化的产物 ,而是理性的当事人相互博弈的结果。In this paper, we consider that the ultimate purpose of the firm is to create and distribute the organizational rent, although the arrangements of residual claim right and control is very important. A lot of literatures confuse the “specificity” with the economic base which can help the interested parties obtain some organizational rent, but in fact “specificity” will weaken the interested parties' bargaining power. We put forward that the base of bargaining power is virtually the “exclusiveness”, a variable that exercises a great impact on the choice and evolution of enterprise instituion. In short,we consider that in reality the enterprise's institutional arrangements is not the product of social welfare maximization or transational cost minimization,but the outcome of games among rational interested parties.

关 键 词：专用性 组织租金 企业制度 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]