寡头垄断市场中企业兼并的一般均衡分析  

General Equilibrium Analysis of Mergers and Acquisition in Oligopolistic Market

作　　者：张显东[1] 李宇宏[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《复旦学报（自然科学版）》2001年第2期153-157,共5页Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science

摘　　要：提出了一种生产者具有超额垄断利润的一般均衡模型 ,并将该模型扩展到寡头垄断市场 ,考虑寡头生产者按古诺模型进行博弈的情况下 ,产品市场、劳动力市场和资本市场的全局均衡 .在该模型框架下 ,分析了企业兼并的福利效果 ,指出由企业兼并引起的全部产品产量的变化所导致的消费者效用变化是社会福利分析的基础 .A general equilibrium model for monopolisitic market is presented, in which producers have extra monopolistic profit. The model is expanded to oligopolisitic market, where oligopolistic producers make decisions according to the Cournot Model and the general equilibrium are reached. With the help of this general equilibrium model, the welfare of M&A are analyzed. The paper points out that the customer utility changes caused by products quantity changes are the main point in welfare analysis of M&A. The model offers us an new analysis tool other than the partial equilibrium analysis.

关 键 词：企业兼并 福利分析 一般均衡模型 博弈论 古诺模型 寡头垄断市场 反垄断政策 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]