双重博弈中的激励与行为——对转轨时期国有企业经理激励不足的一种新解释  

The Incentives and Behavior in Dual Games

作　　者：王珺[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,510275

出　　处：《经济研究》2001年第8期71-78,共8页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：中山大学广东发展研究院资助课题的一部分

摘　　要：本文通过对经理与行政组织的重复性博弈、经理与企业组织的一次性博弈研究 ,提出了国企经理的双重博弈假说 ,指出了行政组织作为强激励主体是导致国企经理在长期关系中出现短期行为的制度性根源 ,以实证数据验证了这种假说。In this paper,the hypothesis of dual games is at first put forward.Based on the basic characteristics of dual relationship between managers in the stated owned enterprises(SOE) and the enterprises organizations,the managers and the administrative organizations,of which relationship between managers in SOE and the enterprises organization is defined as one times game,while the relationship between managers in SOE and the administrative organization as repeated game.And then,the hypothesis takes a test through the investigated data.Finally,some suggestions with regard to the improvement of incentive institutions of managers are given on the basis of analyses of the dual games effect on the behaviors of managers in SOEs.

关 键 词：双重博弈 激励制度 国有企业 经理 行政组织 转轨时期 中国 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]