官僚体制中的契约与激励机制——对转轨经济中官员腐败的一个新解释  

The Contract and Incentive Mechanism in the Bureaucratic System——A new explanation of the official's corruption in the transition

作　　者：张延人[1] 顾江[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院经济学系,210093

出　　处：《经济研究》2001年第10期1-12,共12页Economic Research Journal

摘　　要：本文主要运用信息经济学基本理论从一个新的视角对转轨经济中官员的腐败行为加以解释。通过模型我们首先证明 ,在完全信息条件下官僚集团的廉洁与效率可以同时达到。随后我们推出在不完全信息条件下的统制经济中 ,统治者要有效地激励官员必然要以特权为手段 ,以效率为代价 ,而这恰恰构成了将来经济转轨过程中官员腐败的主要潜在因素。最后 ,我们可以看到 ,在统治者主导的制度变迁中 ,腐败主要来自两个方面的原因 :一是来自于统治者保持官僚集团内部效率的需要 ,二是来自于企业家与统治者在信息水平和激励能力上的差异 ,前者具有负效应而后者具有正效应。制度变迁的最终结果是使官僚集团的规模与统治者的信息水平一致 ,从而实现经济效率与社会公正。This paper is to give an explanation of the official's corruption in the transition based on the fundamental principles of information economics at a new angle of view.First of all,it proves with a model that there is a possibility to achieve the honesty and efficiency simultaneously in the bureaucratic group under the perfect information;Secondly,it points out that in the control economy and under the imperfect information if the governor wants to create incentive for the officials,must use the privilege as a means at the expense of the efficiency,and this is just the main potential factors which give rise to the corruption during the transition.Finally,it is shown that the corruption stems mainly from two causes during the institutional change sponsored by the governor,one is the need of the governor to keep the efficiency in the bureaucratic group,the another is the difference between the governor and entrepreneur in respect of their capability to get information and create incentive.The former has a negative effect,and the latter—positive effect.The ultimate result of the institutional change is the consistency of the size of bureaucratic group with the information level held by the governor,and only in such circumstances economic efficiency and the social justice could be realized.

关 键 词：腐败 契约 官僚体制 激励机制 转轨经济 制度变迁 

分 类 号：F08[经济管理—政治经济学]