上市公司混合购并效率分析  

Analysis on the Efficiency of Conglomerate Mergers of Listed

作　　者：刘焰[1] 邹珊刚[1] 刘颖[2] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院 [2]暨南大学法学院

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2001年第10期102-105,共4页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目 (99CFX0 .6) .

摘　　要：通过建立博弈论模型 ,分析了公司治理结构中控制权与剩余索取权在三种不同的安排下公司购并的决策过程 ,论证了混合购并绩效不佳的原因 .建立经济学模型 。Western countries′ conglomerate merger companies formed in the conglomerate merger wave become to pay attention to their corn business. Owing to shortcomings of our economic system, conglomerate merger is the main form in China′s M&A market. By using models of the Game, the article explains the reason that the efficiency of conglomerate merger is lower than that of the others. By means of economic model, the article analyzes three arrangements between demand for control and residual clains and their influence on the efficiency of conglomerate mergers.

关 键 词：上市公司 控制权 剩余索取权 混合购并 博弈 企业 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]