国有企业债转股的博弈论模型  

A Game Theory Model of Swap of Debt to Equity in State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：蒲勇健[1] 杨丽铃[1] 赵倩[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2001年第4期21-25,共5页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：中国信达资产管理公司资助项目

摘　　要：我国国有企业债转股是借鉴国外成功实践经验 ,并结合国内实际情况而采取的国有企业改革的重要手段。本文通过构建完全信息与不完全信息动态博弈模型 ,导出政府、银行、企业三方局中人在实施债转股中所达到的子博弈精炼纳什均衡 。Learning from the successful and practical experience of some foreign countries, and combining it with the reality of China, the government has been performing the swap of debt to equity for helping the state owned enterprises out of the morass It is an important measure taken by the government to proceed the reformation of the state owned enterprises By constructing dynamic game model of complete information and incomplete information, this paper deduces the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium among government, bank and enterprises during the swap and analyzes the operating countermeasures which the state owned commerical bank should take after swap

关 键 词：债转股 国企改革 博弈论 完全信息动态博弈模型 不完全信息动态博弈模型 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济]