我国上市公司的股权结构与内部人控制  

Equity Structure and Insider Control of Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：尹伯成[1] 薛锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经论丛（浙江财经学院学报）》2001年第6期1-4,共4页

摘　　要：现代企业理论表明，内部人控制产生与公司股权结构有关。当股权相当集中时，不易产生内部人控制。我国上市的国有企业的股权高度集中（国有股通常一股独大），但内部人控制现象普遍惊人，根源在于所有者缺位，董事会成员与经理人员却是代理人，都有为了自己利益而偏离全体股东利益的动机。因而，解决内部人控制问题，必须改善公司股权结构。Modem enterprise theory indicates that the origin of insider control relates to the company's equity struc- ture. When the equity is considerably centered, the insider control will not arise. However, the equity of our listed state owned enterprises is highly centered (the state-owned shares being absolutely predominant). while the insider control exists universally. The root of this phenomenon is the owner absence. The members of the board and the managers are all agents In order to play their own game, both of them have the incentive to deviate and harm the whole shareholders' benefits. Therefore, the equity structure must be improved if the problem of insider control is expected to solve.

关 键 词：中国 上市公司 内部人控制 股权结构 所有者缺位 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理] F279.21[经济管理—国民经济]